CeSPI

Civil-military relations in PSOs.
The Italian experience,
CIMIC and future perspectives

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

AJP – Allied Joint Publication
ALNAP – Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AOP – Area of Operations
CDO – Collective Defence Operations
CEP – Civil Emergency Planning
CGS – CIMIC Group South
CIMIC – Civil Military Cooperation
CMO – Crisis Management Operations
CRO – Crisis Response Operations
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECHO – European Community Humanitarian Office
EU – European Union
IASC – Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA – International Council of Voluntary Associations
IO – International Organisations
JFC – Joint Force Commander
JOA – Joint Operation Area
KFOR – NATO Kosovo Force
MC – Military Committee
MCDA – Military and Civil Defence Assets
MSU – Multinational Specialised Units
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN – United Nations
OOTW – Operations Other Than War
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PK – Peacekeeping
PKO – Peacekeeping Operation
PSF – Peace Support Force
PSOs – Peace Support Operations
ROE – Rules of Engagement
SFOR – Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SMD – Italian Defence General Staff
UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to provide elements for deepening the Italian debate on civil-military relations in Peace Support Operations (PSOs), showing its limits, potentialities and future perspectives.

To this aim, the paper focuses first on the conceptual framework within which the international and Italian reflections on the civil-military relations debate have developed. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), in particular, uses the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) tool as a central instrument for crisis management operations, as it constitutes a means for coordination of civilian and military activities.[1] In fact, NATO's CIMIC is divided into two components under a unified command: a multinational staff composed of all the countries that have signed the Memorandum of Understanding as well as all Italian military forces, and an operational component of the army. An innovative aspect of CIMIC is that it includes civilian staff with specific expertise in fields such as public affairs, economics, humanitarian support and cultural affairs. These experts are carefully selected and are called Functional Specialists.

In order to set the conceptual framework for peace missions, several sources have been used, including documents produced by the United Nations (UN), Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), NATO, the European Union (EU), the Italian Defence General Staff (SMD), as well as by PSOs and civil-military relations experts. These documents include the *Brahimi Report*, NATO's Doctrinal publications (*AJP 3.4.1* and *AJP 9*) and the UN *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* (May 1994). This last document, known as the Oslo Guidelines, introduces the concept of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), establishing the terms of reference for both military and civilian personnel working in crisis management or post-conflict reconstruction activities. In March 2003, this document was updated by the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*, which have also been used for setting the conceptual framework of the paper.

Regarding the Italian sources, the analysis of relevant documents, together with interviews of pertinent actors, has allowed us to:

- Outline the profile and modus operandi of military staff and humanitarian and NGOs' workers.
- Identify patterns regarding issues related to civil-military relations, in order to find ways to improve the Italian profile and the efficacy of its approach to PSOs.

In fact, the paper has identified the profile of Italian peacekeepers, with the aim of contributing to the Italian debate on the approach to peace missions. This is of particular importance as Italy has

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[1] For this reason, NATO member countries have supported the creation of a single CIMIC doctrine for the Alliance. Indeed, previous experiences had demonstrated the need for a common set of standards for NATO to be able to implement a coherent approach to multinational operations. Another major institution, the European Union (EU), has created its own CIMIC doctrine, which has become part of the European Security and Defence Policy.

The texts used for the analysis of NATO CIMIC concept and their selecting criteria are as follows: 1) *Allied Joint Publication-3.4.1 (AJP-3.4.1) NATO Peace Support Operations* (July 2001) has been selected to establish the conceptual framework for the application of the strategic and operational PSO concept in which NATO CIMIC is applied. As stated by NATO, the aim of *AJP-3.4.1* is "to develop and describe military doctrine for the conduct of PSO […] it aims to guide and inform those involved at both the strategic and operational levels in the conduct of NATO and NATO-led PSO"; in: *AJP-3.4.1*, Preface, par. 0003, p. xi; 2) *MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation* (February 2001), and *AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine* (July 2003), which explain the strategic and operational aspects of CIMIC.

been appointed leading nation, within NATO, for the creation of the CIMIC Group South.[2] The group will allow for the capitalisation of Italian lessons learned in peace missions, as well as for the sharing of lessons learned among Southern European countries.

Lastly, the paper analyses the profile of civilian and military operators, in order to highlight both their distinct features as well as possible ways for collaboration in crisis zones.

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[2] Since the year 2000, the Italian Ministry of Defence has been appointed the leading role for the creation of NATO's CIMIC Group South (CGS). Therefore, a CIMIC Group, a CIMIC *Support Company* and a CIMIC *Functional Specialist Team* were created in Motta di Livenza (Treviso, Italy). In 2001, under the guidance of the Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze – Joint Operational Command, the activities of the international and interforces working group began, with the aim of defining the levels of participation and of creating the operational doctrine for the Group. Italy, Greece, Portugal, Hungary and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe signed the *Memorandum of Understanding* which concluded the creation process in February 2004.

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND THE CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION CONCEPT

Throughout the '90s, the administration of second-generation peacekeeping operations, side by side with traditional and wider peacekeeping operations, has enhanced the role of the civilian components of the missions, making their contribution as important as that of the military. Following the inconsistency of the 1990s, in the year 2000, the Brahimi[3] Report revised the operational, administrative and political mechanisms that regulated peacekeeping operations. The Report reaffirms the following fundamental principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defence, but it also offers a new interpretation of the concept of impartiality. The Report displays a broader interpretation of this concept, distinctly separated from the previous concept of neutrality. So, impartiality is meant not as simply being equal to the parties at conflict in spite of their behaviour, but rather being impartial in the effort put into implementing the mandate and in reacting to breached agreements or non-compliance with the mandate.

Experience has shown that crisis management operations and reconstruction processes need a multi-dimensional approach as well as the contribution of a broad variety of actors in order to make possible the physical, social and human reconstruction of war-torn areas.

This multi-dimensional approach to PSOs is an aspect in need of a significant amount of work. A solution must be found for problems such as the integration of evacuees and local population, the coordination of humanitarian and development agencies and organisations, the collaboration between international and local organisations, proper utilisation of refugee knowledge and skills, as well as finding effective techniques for dealing with each individual crisis.

NATO AND PSOS

NATO has defined PSOs through the doctrinal publication *NATO AJP 3.4.1*, which defines them as follows:

"multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSOs are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief."[4]

This definition sets the difference between PSOs and other military operations, as in PSOs there is no designated enemy and they do not aim at military victory. Rather, PSOs aim at creating a secure environment in which civilian agencies can operate, fully recognising their role and importance.[5] Indeed, one of the aims of the mission is to eventually transfer the efforts made by the Peace Support Force (PSF) to the civilian components of the mission, so that the PSF can put its exit strategy into practice.[6]

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[3] United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, (2000), *Report Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (A/55/305-S/2000/809). Available at www.un.org/peace/brahimireport 22.07.05.
[4] *Allied Joint Publication-3.4.1 (AJP-3.4.1), NATO Peace Support Operations*, (2001), Ch. 2, par. 0202.
[5] *Ibidem*. "PSOs are designed to create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create self-sustaining peace." Par. 0203.
[6] *Ibidem*. "The achievement of the military objectives and the creation of a secure environment do not guarantee the establishment of self-sustaining peace. But without security (and justice), the reconciliation, reconstruction and development programmes necessary to create a self-sustaining peace are unlikely to be effective. However, once the security related military objectives have been achieved, the attainment of the political end-state will require the mission's main effort to be switched from the PSF to the peace building activities of the civilian components of the

PSOs AND THE ITALIAN DEFENCE SYSTEM

Although the Italian Defence appeals to the Brahimi Report and NATO doctrine for reference, it defines missions abroad as "military operations other than war" (OOTW). These include humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building.

Since the beginning of the millennium, the civilian and military components of PSOs have experimented with new means and tools for crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, these two components have worked in either a "complex model"[7] within which they have collaborated, as has often happened, for example through civil-military cooperation mechanisms (CIMIC), or, also a common occurrence, they have been an obstacle to one another (see Civil-military debate on page 11).

Reaching a balance between the civilian and military components in PSOs is essential, as these include humanitarian assistance, international cooperation and a wide range of civilian tasks. In this context and in view of the lessons learned, the civil-military relation has acquired a fundamental role at all levels of PSOs. For this reason, some nations, as well as the European Union (EU)[8] and NATO, are in the process of modifying their CIMIC doctrines.

NATO AND CIMIC

For NATO, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is an essential tool "to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of a lasting solution to a crisis."[9] Indeed, NATO defines CIMIC as a means for achieving the involvement of both military and civilian implementing agencies in the development of a multifunctional planning approach. Therefore, coordination of activities and unity of effort of military and civilian actors is essential to make the best use of resources and promote collaboration. In this context, "the immediate aim is to fully co-ordinate civilian and military activities to support humanitarian projects and to achieve the maximum support for the operation, at the expense of any opposition."[10]

The NATO doctrine assigns a wide variety of tasks to CIMIC personnel, such as: a) liaise with civilian bodies at all levels; b) implement integrated planning both at the strategic and operational level with the appropriate civilian bodies, before and during the operation; c) carry out a continuous assessment of the civilian environment in order to identify needs and deficiencies at the local level, as well as ways these can be provided for; d) oversee the conduct of civilian tasks by the military force; e) work towards the transfer of civil responsibilities from the PSF to the competent civilian authority; f) work with other staff branches on all aspects of the operation; g) advise the Commander on all above mentioned tasks.[11] Other CIMIC tasks are strictly mission-dependent.[12]

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mission. Without such a switch of main effort and a commensurate switch of funding and resources, the operation is unlikely to progress beyond that of a military stalemate." Par. 0207.

[7] Definition adopted by the *Brahimi Report* to specify the new crisis modalities in which the UN is being called to intervene. *Brahimi Report, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Part II: Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations*, p.1, available at www.un.org/peace/brahimireport.

[8] A regards the definition of CIMIC adopted by the European Union, it is as follows: "the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civilian actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international and national and non-governmental organisations and agencies" 7106/02 *Civil-military Concept for EU-led CMO*, G20.

[9] *Allied Joint Publication-9 (AJP-9) NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine*, par. 105.

[10] AJP 3.4.1, Ch. 6, par. 0645, p. 17.

[11] AJP-9, Ch. 1, par. 105.

[12] *Ibidem*.

Additionally, in Crisis Response Operations[13], CIMIC is meant to facilitate the cooperation between the NATO Commander and all civilian components present in the Joint Operation Area[14]. NATO doctrine asserts the need for appropriate resources as "although CIMIC activities are within the domain of all military personnel, there may be a requirement for additional CIMIC assets to be deployed into theatre in direct support of the mission. These will fall into one of two categories: CIMIC Forces or Functional Specialists."[15]

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALISTS

Functional Specialists are deployed when their expertise is needed in the Area of Operations (AOP) and the military forces already present cannot satisfy it. Functional Specialists "may come from a wide range of sources and are not necessarily military personnel. They may be required to assist in assessments, analysis, or the planning process or they may be required for the execution of specific projects."[16] "Their number and area of expertise will vary according to need and availability. They will only be employed for the duration of the specified task and may be either military or civilian. The terms under which the latter are employed will be determined by the legal requirements of the donor nation. However, they must be under readiness states that enable them to deploy when required. CIMIC groups are likely to contain a number of military personnel capable of carrying out specific CIMIC functional activities. Nations have sources of functional specialists who together may provide a pool of expertise."[17]

In Italy, civilian personnel with suitable qualifications can apply to volunteer as a Functional Specialist. These are mainly lawyers, psychologists, engineers, economists, geologists, local administrators and jurists, to name a few categories. Functional Specialists attend a four-week training course to become officers, as well as a CIMIC course. As defined by the Italian CIMIC doctrine, the role of Functional Specialists is established by the Marconi Law, going back to 1932[18] (decree Law no. 215 of 2001).

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PSOS: RESPECTIVE VIEWS

Civil-military relations in PSOs are complex and dynamic. These features characterise the relation whether it develops within the CIMIC tool, which is under military command, or independently from it. We will now analyse the view that NATO and civilian humanitarian experts have of civil-military relations in PSOs. Prior to this analysis, we will briefly introduce a fundamental and

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[13] Two NATO doctrinal documents, MC 411/1 *NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation* and AJP-9 *NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine*, define the strategic and operational aspects of CIMIC. These refer to military operations that are defined as *Crisis Response Operations* (CROs) rather than PSOs. CROs seem to have replaced PSOs as they had been defined in a first NATO doctrinal publication, AJP-3.4.1. Still, a specific definition for CROs is not given. CROs are simply differentiated from the collective defence operations described in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We mention, also, the classification of CRO agreed upon and used by the Italian Defence General Staff. CROs are operations that comprise political, diplomatic and military tools to prevent and resolve conflicts, in accordance with International Law. These operations are divided in PSOs and other operations non-article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – support to humanitarian operations, assistance to natural disasters, search and rescue operations, support to non-combatants evacuation; national citizens rescue operations, military operations in support of civilian authorities, imposition of sanctions.

[14] MC 411/1, Section 1, p. 1.

[15] AJP-9, Ch. 1, par. 105-4.

[16] AJP 9, par. 105, 4-b.

[17] AJP 9, par. 501, 1-b.

[18] Provided for in the Royal Decree of 1932 (art. 4), modified by Decree Law no. 490/1997 (art. 34).

underlying aspect of current missions, the issue of security, as it is of great importance for the development of civil-military relations.

Security

Humanitarian work is strongly influenced by the provision of security to humanitarian workers. Although there exist no official statistics of violent incidents during humanitarian crises, Dennis King developed one of the most reliable studies on this subject in 2002. The study identified the ten countries at highest risk - Angola, Sudan, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Burundi, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia and East-Timor, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo. The analysis also displays that on a sample of 140 cases of violent death, 47% of them happened during assaults to vehicles or convoys carried out by outlaws or rebel groups.[19] Regarding the victims of violent assaults, 74% of them were local staff, and 26% were expatriates. Of these, 60% belonged to NGOs.

The issue of security in crisis areas and of those who live and work in them is always central to the military mandate in PSOs, as achieving security is purely a military responsibility. For this reason, NATO doctrine has approached the subject and has concluded that in order to achieve and sustain the support of the local community and of civilian actors in the Area of Operations 1) every effort needs to be made to avoid the mission having a negative impact on the local population; 2) all feasible measures need to be taken to avoid the military mission compromising the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian organisations.[20]

Indeed, AJP-9 fully acknowledges the importance of NGOs and their capacity to work at field level; it identifies three categories:

- organisations that have made agreements with the government of the country they are working in;
- organisations that have been contracted by the UN or by the authority in charge;
- organisations that work independently.

At the same time, it is also emphasised that International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs often count on military protection against assaults in order to be able to carry out their tasks.[21]

Civilian actors' profile

What is the profile of civilian actors working in PSOs? Indeed, it is not a rhetoric question. The profile is mainly defined by NGOs although throughout the 1990s other actors of civil society, such as solidarity associations, human rights organisations, Local Authorities, and universities, have played an important role in peacekeeping operations. Despite their differences, all these actors share the same commitment towards the use of people-to-people networks and the use of local resources. This allows them and their projects to reach and influence society at various levels. This makes them also able to understand the intricate and intertwined dimensions of a crisis.

Regarding the political and cultural point of view, these actors are able to act as mediators and facilitators in reconciliation processes, as often they have access to the groups and organisations responsible for the tensions and instability. For this reason, they can play a fundamental role at various levels in a post-war society.

Civilian actors work through partnerships, developing relations at the local level that contribute to strengthening civil society. Resulting from the experience in Bosnia Herzegovina, experts and

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[19] Dennis King (2002)- *Paying the ultimate price: an analysis of aid-worker fatalities*, in Humanitarian Practice Network – Humanitarian Policy Group. Available at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2454.
[20] MC 411/1, p. 3-4.
[21] AJP-9, par. 805.

analysts have underlined the need to "empower local NGOs, promote citizens' involvement, train the trainers, and promote grass-root level dialogue."[22]

As for the political legitimating of NGOs, according to Hugo Slim[23] this is based on factors such as the moral motivations for their work, their ethics and integrity, their field presence, competence, their recognition of legality as defined by International Law, and, in particular, their responsibility and transparency.

The civil-military debate

Civilian actors in crisis areas can interact with the military at different levels. These levels define a possible, potential or actual relation with military actors, with an active participation to CIMIC at the end of this spectrum. At the operational level, in fact, CIMIC supports a wide range of mission activities, such as communication, information sharing, coordination and facilitation towards agreements. Obtaining actual coordination among military forces, political, diplomatic and administrative bodies, and humanitarian agencies can often be difficult, even though it is important for the development of the military mandate and the success of the military mission. Difficulties mainly arise from the fact that civilian organisations and military forces present in the crisis area often work towards different aims. In fact, because of their origins and nature, civilian organisations tend to be politically independent and to establish their own objectives.

Indeed, NATO, IOs, NGOs, the donors, and the UN all follow their own organisational cultures, and are characterised by national, professional and institutional differences. The influence this has had on the realisation of the CIMIC tool must be taken into serious consideration and must not be underestimated.

Moreover, from many consultations with humanitarian actors, it emerges that they consider CIMIC as a military tool to reach military objectives. In their view, CIMIC aims at taking advantage of the presence of civilian actors, and is often used for intelligence activities. It is also seen as a coordination model where the military have a dominant and guiding role that civilian actors do not accept. These are certainly controversial issues that influence the perception civilian actors have of the civil-military relation. The different perception on issues such as security can only deepen the already frequent misunderstandings.

In spite of these differences, we can identify some features that both civilian and military actors must have. NATO AJP-9 recognises some common principles for civilian and military actors working in crisis areas, which are independent from CIMIC:

– **Cultural awareness**: sensitivity towards customs, local way of life and culture is fundamental in all missions.[24]

– **Shared responsibility**: "The analysis of common goals should lead to an agreed sharing of responsibilities in order to establish and maintain a durable and mutually beneficial relationship. CIMIC must establish co-operation arrangements and transition mechanisms with

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[22] Orna, Tamches Blum (1999), "Voices for Women – Forces for Change: Building Peace in the Bosnian Community" in Steven M. Riskin (ed.) *Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia*, PeaceWorks no 32, United States Institute for Peace, Washington.

[23] Hugo Slim (2002), "By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-governmental Organisations", contribution to the conference International Meeting on Global Trends and Human Rights Before and After September 11th, International Council on Human Rights Policy, Geneva, January 10-12. Available at http://jha.ac/articles/a082.htm

[24] AJP-9, Ch. 2, paragraph 203.

the civilian organisations as soon as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings and define their respective roles and responsibilities."[25]

- **Transparency:** the specific roles and tasks of the various actors involved must be clear and respected in order to prevent misunderstanding and confusion.

- **Communication:** "Effective communication with civil authorities, agencies, organisations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and co-operation."[26]

As regards NGOs, they have distinctive characteristics that are indispensable in crisis areas and unstable contexts, such as working through a net of relations coordinated at world, continental, national and local level. This is a multi-centred system that ensures a comprehensive, although imperfect, coherence when humanitarian interventions are implemented, together with the UN, ECHO, ICRC and other international institutions.

Following the Rwanda crisis in 1994, further steps have been made in order to set coordination mechanisms at all levels, thanks to the work of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and various international networks of NGOs (ICVA, InterAction, SCHR and Voice): from the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to local coordination groups of NGOs, present in all crisis areas. Within these coordination groups, which we can define "horizontal", some of the big agencies, or agencies of particular relevance to the specific context, can assume the role of leading agency, exercising greater authority and influence. In all cases, the need for dialogue, information sharing and mediation as fundamental ways to reach beneficiaries' consensus is stressed. The use of these tools often starts processes that demand a significant amount of time to develop. This way of working may exasperate those who collaborate with NGOs, but it is the result of carefully considered choices, which are often more efficient and realistic than external ready-to-use interventions.

It is apparent that this network system may be incompatible with more "vertical" systems, and with the general idea that, in complex crisis, somebody needs to be in control of the situation. Nevertheless, it is also possible that NGOs' ability to assist in humanitarian crises will be improved by this mechanism, following the trend that started in the 1990s, which made the NGO community the first provider of humanitarian assistance.

Civilian experts highlight that there is great confusion concerning the roles and objectives of humanitarian and civilian actors in humanitarian interventions. In this context, the military are considered a specialised structure, provider of security, logistics, engineering, demining and medical assistance, all fields where their abilities and experience are certainly appreciated.

Civil-military coordination is influenced by their respective institutional culture and organisation typology. The civil-military relationship seems to be determined by necessity, according to the kind of crisis and the nature of intervention, and it is certainly unstable. In general, military and civilian workers should both have a clear view and understanding of their respective roles and of how to implement them.

Humanitarian workers often lament the military's inability to discriminate amongst civilian actors, classifying them all as NGOs, as well as their inability to distinguish between human rights organisations and development agencies.

The military instead, tend to consider civilians in the Area of Operations, who are not part of the military mission, as non-hostile but certainly out-of-control elements, which are often impossible to understand. On this matter, NATO AJP-9 underlines that:

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[25] *Ibidem.*
[26] *Ibidem.*

"The most effective way for military forces to understand the skills, knowledge and capabilities of IOs and NGOs is to maintain relationships with them prior to entering an area of operations, and to educate themselves through military schools and courses which incorporate integrated training. This can provide much insight into these organisations and can establish good working relationships based on trust and understanding"[27]

Civilian humanitarian actors admit their inability to understand the internal mechanisms and the conditioned reactions of the military structure. They also admit that their prejudices towards the military constitute one of the main limits to information sharing and to the mutual understanding of their roles. This has a negative impact on security, a very delicate issue, particularly following the adoption of the War on Terror approach for the past five years. This approach has undoubtedly modified some of the above-cited cultural elements, mainly for the military but also, in some cases, for the NGOs. In fact, these may prefer to enhance the already-existing differences between them and the military, consequently enhancing the distance between the two components.

There is strong consensus among the humanitarian community on the fact that the military should not carry out humanitarian projects on their own, or provide humanitarian assistance. The military are considered unsuitable for evaluating needs, or the impact of their interventions on the local population according to the principle of sustainability; indeed, their training does not prepare them to implement these tasks. For this reason, the military may react in the same way when faced with a food riot than when facing an attack to the force. Consequently, the humanitarian community believes that civilian control of humanitarian assistance should always be maintained at all levels. Humanitarian actors also believe that in complex emergencies they should never be deployed simply to support the military force. Rather, civilian and military actors should be equally integrated to the mission.

While civilian humanitarians reaffirm their independence from politics, they also believe they have the analytical capacity that allows them to understand the political processes that develop in parallel with the various phases of a crisis. They believe that the military, instead, is less qualified to do so.

As regards the coordination of activities, civilian humanitarian actors emphasise the great difference that exists between missions that are carried out under UN auspices and those that, instead, are not authorised by a UN Security Council Resolution. Under UN auspices, there are greater chances for civil-military cooperation. In UN missions, NGOs tend to accept to work governed by external coordination mechanisms, as long as this is coherent with their mandate and objectives.

When interventions are developed without previous UN approval, the relations between NGOs and the military depend on subjective choices and circumstances, and are assessed case by case according to the specific context of the crisis. This applies also to security issues. Security must always be taken into consideration, and coordination works better when civilian and military actors share the same operational objectives.

ITALIAN PEACEKEEPING: PERSPECTIVES AND EVOLUTION

The Italian approach to peacekeeping shows that the Italian military have skills, competences, and specificities that should be further explored and exploited, and that are useful to CIMIC. Their participation in missions abroad has been characterised by a *super partes* presence and a strong humanitarian approach[28]. This is demonstrated by their direct involvement in the distribution of humanitarian aid, assistance to the local population, and their overall competency and

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[27] AJP 9, Ch. 8, par. 805-5.
[28] Guido Venturoni (1996), *Le Forze Armate Italiane nelle Operazioni di Pace*, intervention made at the Seminar *Italy and the United Nations*, organised by the Società Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale (SIOI), 9 January and 27-28 January 1996, Rome.

professionalism in responding to humanitarian emergencies. These initiatives have been of great importance for the development of their profile and characteristics[29].

With the evolution of the peacekeeping concept, new possibilities for action developed for the Italian military. These were mainly mediation activities, which derived from the relation they developed with the members of the communities where they intervened. Indeed, the Italian military have shown to be amongst the most suitable to work in complex crises as, since their experience in Lebanon, they have demonstrated good skills as regards negotiation with and mediation between the parties in conflict.

A greater role has also developed throughout time for the Arma dei Carabinieri, which participation in PSOs has gradually increased. Currently, the role of the Carabinieri is of fundamental importance in framing the peculiarities of the Italian approach to peacekeeping.[30]

From 1980 until today, this approach can be summarised through two important criteria. First, an intelligence component trained and qualified to work on missions abroad. Second, as explained above, the ability of Italian military personnel to develop a good relationship with the civilian population.

This doubled nature method is a decisive factor when analysing a humanitarian intervention; it is, as well, an important element in the role played by the Italian military in PSOs. Other important features of the Italian approach to Peacekeeping are[31]:

- The use of human and material resources proportionate to the need;

- The flexibility of the decision making mechanism for military planning;

- The adaptability of the decision making mechanism to the context needs', in full respect of the chain of command and of the R.O.E.;

- The ability to mediate and negotiate to promote dialogue among the parties in conflict;

- The increasing importance of CIMIC and of the role of civilians.

Traditionally, in order to satisfy the growing need for professionalism, operational cadres have adapted to the peacekeeping context, following the behavioural models elaborated by the Italian Defence for military personnel to be deployed in missions abroad.

This has meant that the Italian Defence has paid more attention to the education and professionalisation of military personnel, training them in practical aspects of peace operations such as those asserted by the Code of Conduct of UN Blue Helmets.[32] Such principles include:

- Respect the law of the land of the host country, their local culture, traditions, customs and practices[33];

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[29] Defence General Staff (1995), "Operazione Somalia: gli ammaestramenti", in Ruggiero Stanglini (ed.), *1992-1994. Operazione Somalia*, Edizioni Aeronautiche Italiane, Florence.

[30] In 1998, in the mission to Bosnia Herzegovina, the Arma dei Carabinieri worked for the first time as a *Multinational Specialised Unit* (MSU), made of multinational police units, increasingly engaged in internal security and law and order activities as part of their contribution to Peace Support Operations ". Therefore, the MSU contributed towards the implementation of the Dayton Agreements, managing the existing *security gap* between military forces and the destabilised structure of the local authorities. Information available at the Arma dei Carabinieri website, http://www.carabinieri.it/ind_ita.htm. For a deeper analysis, see Annex 2.

[31] Seminar organised by CeSPI and the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento (Pisa), in collaboration with NATO Press and Media Office, *Civilian and Military Actors in Peacekeeping Operations and Crisis Management*, Rome, 29 May 2003.

[32] Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Ten Rules. Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets.* Available at http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkindex.html.

[33] For in-depth information see Rossella Bonanni (2001), "La preparazione del personale militare alle operazioni di mantenimento della pace. Confronti Italia – Francia", in Romano Bettini (ed.) *Peacekeeping, polizia internazionale e*

- Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population or UN staff, especially women and children;

- Show military courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all members of the mission including other UN contingents;

- Show respect for the flora and fauna of the host country.

This has mean, also, that the Italian Defence has translated the experience gained by Italian military personnel in missions abroad into lessons learned, from which we have drawn the following conclusions[34]:

- The land component is essential in order to keep the crisis area under control, as well as for guaranteeing the security of humanitarian and reconstruction initiatives;

- As the operational differences between the combat phase, PSOs and wider peacekeeping are increasingly blurring, the military find themselves working on specific issues related to security, as well as on civilian activities such as Nation and Institution building;

- The activities carried out during the transition phase or "grey zone" towards stability require the use of task forces with specific assets;

- The military are engaged in a wide range of activities: security, CIMIC, reaction to nuclear, biological ad chemical attacks, sanitation, intelligence, support to humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and support to governmental and non-governmental organisation.

These four elements allow us to identify which aspects of the armed forces engaged in missions abroad need to be strengthened or improved, taking into consideration that each operational theatre has its own specificities. In fact, in spite of the humanity, contact skills and great professionalism of the Italian military engaged in peacekeeping missions, there are areas for improvement and potentialities that can be further exploited. Issues, on which efforts need to be concentrated, especially as regards the CIMIC tool, are:

- Cohesion of actions of the various actors involved in order to be able to transfer the Italian system to missions abroad.

- The growing need for joint civil-military training for OOTW.

- The promotion of mutual understanding and knowledge sharing between civilian and military actors.

- The identification of joint training models, appropriate for both civilians and the military.

- The promotion of technical reflection and political debate on how to work in specific crises.

- The creation of synergies between military forces and the Civil Protection Department in OOTW.

- The capitalisation of the experience derived from the relation between the Civil Protection Department, the military and Italian local authorities in the complex emergencies in the Balkans.

- Coherence between political choices and the assignment and use of financial resources.

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nuovi ruoli dei militari tra conflitti etnici, terrorismo, criminalità organizzata, CeMISS Artistic&Publishing Company, Gaeta.

[34] Conclusions drawn by the authors following Lt. General Giulio Fraticelli's intervention (2004), "L'esercito italiano nella funzione di stabilizzazione e ricostruzione" at the Seminar *Operazioni interforze e multinazionali* organised by the Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD), 14 March, Rome.

TRAINING FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACTORS ENGAGED IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The training of all actors involved on general issues and specific aspects of PSOs is of fundamental importance in order to operate adequately in multifunctional operations. NATO AJP-9 clearly affirms the importance of training for military personnel, especially for CIMIC personnel.[35]

The current training of Italian peacekeepers derives from the last reform of the Armed Forces. The reform provides, first, that the military's profile be further professionalized. Second, that the personnel recruited must have higher educational standards than in the past, especially as regards technological knowledge and computer science.[36] Lastly, the reform provides that the military should be trained adequately to engage more frequently in contact with civilians, institutions and civil society in general, be it in national or international emergencies.

This training aims also at improving the performance of the Italian military working in PSOs, as they must be able to operate in stabilisation, reconstruction, and combat contexts. In fact, the Italian Defence, as well as the military personnel interviewed, do not feel the need for a major distinction of roles between peacekeepers and combat forces. The reasons for this attitude are cultural and economic, but also strategic and political. The military consider combat training as a necessary precondition for developing the skills they will need in peacekeeping operations. It is considered essential for achieving security, as well as for personnel management and organisation. Consequently, there exists a single asset, which receives further training according to the characteristics of the specific mission it is called to participate.[37]

As explained in the previous section, the quality standards of military personnel still need to be heightened, as they are called to operate in high risk environments, which require considerable interaction skills not only within the CIMIC tool. The training of this new generation military must provide for joint civil-military training before starting the mission, as well as for a military training that comprises "general education and a specific mission training"[38].

Military training should also include broader education, sociological and humanistic subjects, negotiation techniques, social awareness and a deeper understanding of technology. Skills such as help-relief and police work should be explored and exploited in order to adapt the capacities, knowledge and psychological readiness of the military cadres assigned to PSO missions.

Education and training are also very important for humanitarian workers. This is valid in whatever context the training is developed, be it joint civil-military training, as part of CIMIC or not, or as specific humanitarian training. This is the reason for the creation, in 1994, following the Rwandan genocide, of the SPHERE Project by some of the most important international NGOs together with the Red Cross[39]. The project defined the technical standards and management rules for humanitarian

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[35] AJP-9, Ch. 8, paragraph 805-5.

[36] Fraticelli, *Op. cit*.

[37] Giuseppina Sola (2001), "I compiti delle forze multinazionali nelle operazioni di Pk", in Romano Bettini (ed.) *Peacekeeping: polizia internazionale e nuovi ruoli per i militari tra conflitti etnici, terrorismo, criminalità organizzata*, CeMISS Artistic&Publishing Company, Gaeta. "The military organisation, structured, organised and prepared to engage in war has adapted its structures to the operational needs of PSOs, but it has not modified its culture, its chain of command or its way of commanding. Commanders implement peace-time tasks applying the same operational art they would use in times of war […] While soldiers […] have borne the stress of acting unnaturally […] although ready for combat they find that they can not respond with their weapons when menaced […] either because they are not authorised to do so or because of political reasons". Authors' translation.

[38] Romano Bettini (2001), *Op. cit*.

[39] In 1994, the International Committee of the Red Cross published the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and for Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief. This was the main deontological piece of reference for humanitarian workers and agencies. Available at http://www.solidea.org/document/archivio/condotta.rtf.

interventions[40]. Today, the SPHERE project has become a reference model for the design and implementation of humanitarian operations. In 1994 also the *Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action* (ALNAP)[41] was founded, creating a forum for permanent creation of lessons learned, as well as for the permanent exchange of experiences as regards new techniques and methodologies used by humanitarian workers.

In spite of the need for professionalisation, it is our belief that humanitarian workers must remain mainly "generalists", as their work demands great flexibility, as well as the ability to understand issues such as politics, diverse cultural approaches, gender or religious sensitiveness, sanitation, conflict dynamics, economic mechanisms.

Indeed, humanitarian operators must be aware of the legal and deontological aspects of their work. They must respect the Code of Conduct rigorously. They must also have a deep understanding and knowledge of the operational standards as well as of the existing techniques for conflict analysis and management. Every action that is carried out by those who work in conflict areas can have an impact on the dynamics of conflict, on security, on the relation with the other agencies in the field, as well as on the living standards of war-torn societies. There exist methodologies to limit the negative impact humanitarian aid may have; these methods must be fully understood by humanitarian workers before they intervene in a conflict context[42].

Since 1994, some British universities and organisations have also prepared training modules specifically for humanitarian workers. First among these is the University of York[43] in the United Kingdom. Advanced training is also provided by the non-profit centre RedR[44] in England and Bioforce in France.

As regards joint civil-military training, according to humanitarian experts, it has limited scope; it can be valid only if associated with common goals and if it is jointly tested long before deployment in the crisis area.

There is also wide scepticism among humanitarian workers as regards joint training with the military, as they consider the link between the military and the political sphere to be damaging for their independence. Moreover, the capitalisation of experiences acquired through joint civil-military training is often difficult because of limited economic resources.[45]

There is, therefore, still little room for confrontation of civil and military experiences, both in Italy and abroad. Inevitably, this reflects on the creation and development of the CIMIC tool, on which the debate is still open.

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[40] A group of NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement launched the SPHERE Project in 1997. The first part of the project has produced a Humanitarian Charter and has identified the Minimum Standards that must be guaranteed in disaster relief in the five major fields of intervention: water and hygiene promotion, nutrition, food aid, shelter and sanitation. The Project has a dual goal: to improve the quality standards of the assistance to populations hit by natural disasters, as well as to reinforce the level of responsibility of the humanitarian system in case of intervention. For in-depth information, see www.sphereproject.org.

[41] For more information on the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, see www.alnap.org.

[42] Mary B. Anderson (1996), *Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid*, Cambridge: Collaborative for Development Action, see www.cdaine.com.

[43] The Department of Post Conflict Reconstruction of the University of York has organised, since 1996, the Master in *Post-war Recovery Studies*.
[44] Register of Engineers for Disaster Response, www.redr.org.
[45] Seminar promoted by CeSPI, the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento (Pisa), and NATO Press and Media Office (2003), *Civilian and Military Actors in Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Operations - Approaches, Objectives and Roles in Complex Emergencies*, Executive Summary, 29 May, Residenza di Ripetta, Rome.

CONCLUSIONS

During the last twenty years, peacekeeping operations have evolved considerably, transforming civil-military interaction into one of the most efficient means open to the international community intervening in crisis areas.

From this study it emerges that the more civil-military relations are structured, rather than being left to subjective judgement, the more they project towards a long-term strategy, rather than being left to case by case reactions, then the more they become a tool for the creation of stability and development.

There are many studies, carried out by the United Nations and by non-governmental organisations that look at civil-military relations from a variety of viewpoints. In particular, we suggest two of these, the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* and the *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*[46].

On the subject, the Inter Agency Standing Committee concludes that "within the context of civil-military relations, there are a number of situations where some level of coordination between the humanitarian and military actors may become necessary [...] In any circumstances, however, it is important to maintain a clear separation between the roles of the military and humanitarian actors, by distinguishing their respective spheres of competence and responsibility[47].

This conclusion promotes the understanding of the diversity of roles and mandates of military and civilian actors, as well as of governmental and non-governmental agencies, as an enriching factor, a feature that promotes efficacy and, eventually, the achievement of balance.

Throughout the 1990s, humanitarian assistance was very popular, it was supported by citizens and governments, and it was exalted by NGOs' success as a major actor in international relations. During that decade, it was strongly believed that the post-Cold War world could be based on international law and cooperation.

This study has made clear that, currently, humanitarian workers and organisations are constantly engaged in processes that slowly drain them. It has also shown that the humanitarian mandate is increasingly intertwined and confused with the political-strategic one.

At the operational level, the most significant consequence of this state of facts is the reduction of the humanitarian space. This means, also, smaller chances to live and work in proper security conditions for the victims of conflict and for humanitarian workers.

The military mandate represents, instead, the political will of those who decide the start of the mission put into practice. So, once governments or the United Nations have defined the objectives of the mission, these are identified from a military point of view through the mandate, that establishes security on the field, the specific military objectives and the means to be used to achieve them.

As we have explained in previous paragraphs, military personnel who work in PSOs assume many functions: observation, liaison, protection of refugees and of humanitarian convoys, support to civilian agencies and medical and humanitarian work. Consequently, they need great adaptability skills, as well as the development and improvement of their capability to interact with civilians,

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[46] *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* and *Civil Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies* (2003), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-5KUDK8/$FILE/MCDA-Guidelines-Mar03.doc.

[47] The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (ed.) (2004), *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies,* 28 June 2004. This paper defines civil-military cooperation as "The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training", p. 6. Available at www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/.

especially when doing humanitarian support, coordination activities and consent building. To this aim, CIMIC is a tool that the military must be familiar with, as it represents much more than simply one of the possible kinds of interaction the military can develop with civilian actors. Indeed, the CIMIC tool implies the direct involvement of the military in humanitarian assistance at different levels according to the specific situation.

In the light of this, we can define three possible levels of civil-military interaction in PSOs:

1. <u>Cooperation</u>. This may occur in those operations where there is an explicit UN Security Council mandate. In this case, cooperation regards issues such as assistance to refugees and convoy escort, together with a systematic exchange of information. In this context, cooperation may happen within the CIMIC tool, or through working groups, liaison officers and observers.

2. <u>Cohabitation</u>. Cohabitation, with sporadic collaboration, means that civil-military interaction is different depending on each area where operations are implemented. It means, also, that collaboration depends on the kind of intervention and on each organisation's mandate. This is a likely scenario in OOTW, which have been approved by the Security Council to protect civilian population. In fact, in this case, there is no headquarters for civil-military interaction, or any specific liaison person or institution. Collaboration may occur through CIMIC or through occasional and informal exchange of information.

3. <u>Lack of Coordination</u>. This occurs in case of war or of OOTW with no mandate of the UN Security Council. In these contexts, contact between military and civilian components is exclusively informal, with exchange of information only in possibly deadly situations or for security reasons.

The above cited IASC paper, *Civil-military relationship in complex emergencies*, reminds us that "all humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be in accordance with the overriding core principle[s] of humanity […] However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil-military coordination. Even so, ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives […] At all times, a clear distinction must be maintained between combatants and non-combatants. Thus, humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers […] Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to 'do no harm'".[48]

Regarding the specific Italian case, it is important to underline the need to overcome the cultural problems, which reflect negatively on the civil-military relation. These problems often derive from the stereotypes and prejudices they have for one another. In order to improve this situation, both actors could work on a variety of issues while respecting each other's diversity. They should:

- Create working groups and establish permanent roundtables for consultation;

- Place some of their staff within the various organisations they will be working with in order to deepen their reciprocal understanding and to create liaison staff;

- Create common learning and training courses;

- Promote the reciprocal knowledge of each other's roles and tasks, before the crisis has started as this would ease, in particular, the military's work on the field, be it part of CIMIC or not;

- Identify areas of shared interest for the military and for civilians, in order to build the CIMIC tool upon them;

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[48] *Opus cited.*

- Analyse the possibility to create a specific professional profile for the military in PSOs, which would also include joint training with civilian organisations, and further deepening of the general context as well as the juridical, social sciences and political aspects of the missions.

Lastly, there are recommendations for Italian political authorities, who should adopt some simple measures to ease civil-military relations in peace missions:

- Harmonising the actions of the actors involved, demonstrating the institutional capacity to transfer the Italian approach to the missions abroad;

- Promote a technical reflection on how to operate in specific crises;

- Promptly promote the systematic organisation of lessons learned in peace missions by the military and by civilian organisations.

Again, we underline that the missions carried out in complex crises require the necessary ability to work in a variable environment. The rigidity of operational and organisational structures constitutes an obstacle to the success of the missions. The importance of the capacity to adapt, not only for staff but also for the structures they work in derives from the fact that each crisis is characterised by many stages. Each stage has its own features and needs, which require different staff with specific backgrounds.

For this reason, the growing diversity of the organisations engaged with different roles in every mission guarantees a cultural balance, and a true multi-cultural approach to the problems faced. Where this diversity is not adequately valued, and where the various components of a mission do not intervene in a balanced manner, experience has shown that the stabilisation work in crisis areas and their return to normality reveal to be unsustainable.

NATO CIMIC principles

NATO's doctrine envisages the coordination of civil-military relations throughout all phases of conflict. The principles that influence the conduct of CIMIC fall into two broad categories: principles governing the military direction of CIMIC, and principles governing the civil-military relationship.[49]

As regards the principles governing the military conduct of CIMIC, they guide the internal military processes that make the development of a CIMIC support plan possible, and regulate its execution. The principles established by NATO AJP-9 are:

Mission primacy: NATO conducts CIMIC in support of a military mission. CIMIC enables the commander to interface with the civil aspects of the environment of operation and to absorb civil factors into the planning.

Command Direction: It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to direct CIMIC activities, achieve the necessary unity of command and unity of effort and recognise the importance of integrating into the overall effort. Commanders should be aware of the impact of military operations on the civil environment and the impact of the civil environment on their operations.

Economy*:* Commanders must seek to avoid the use of military assets on non-military tasks. Military resources are finite and care must be taken to preserve military capability; only the minimum required to achieve a given, authorised task in support of the civilian population or civilian organisations should be used. Commanders must also guard against creating long-term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government, IOs or NGOs.

Prioritisation and concentration: Assets available for CIMIC are likely to be limited; therefore, they should be concentrated on tasks of the highest priority. Concentration has the advantage of improving civilian perceptions of the military force and demonstrating its determination to act in the civil interest.

Legal obligations and humanitarian considerations: Commanders have a legal responsibility to comply with Law of Armed Conflict. Legal staff will advise the Commander on these matters. Commanders should seek, within the constraints of the mission, to reduce the effect of military operations on non-combatants. This is fundamental to consolidating mission legitimacy. Human rights of individuals and groups must be respected and protected in compliance with International Law and the Law of Armed Conflict.

As regards the principles governing the civil-military relationship, these principles offer guidance on the establishment and maintenance of effective civil-military relationships with civilian authorities, lead agencies, organisations and populations. Through these principles, we can also determine the profile of the NATO military personnel engaged in CIMIC activities. Such principles are:

Cultural Awareness: a sustained sensitivity towards local customs, mores, culture and ways of life is of fundamental importance to all missions. The military must acquire a sound understanding of local culture, customs and laws.

Common goals: although those operating within a JOA may have different immediate interests, common goals shared by NATO forces and civilian organisations should wherever possible be established and recognised.

Shared responsibility: The analysis of common goals should lead to an agreed sharing of responsibilities in order to establish and maintain a durable and mutually beneficial relationship.

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[49] This Annex is a synthesis of NATO *AJP-9* (2003), Chapter 2.

CIMIC must establish co-operation arrangements and transition mechanisms with the civilian organisations as soon as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings and define their respective roles and responsibilities.

Consent: every effort should be made to secure and retain the willing co-operation of civilian organisations with which the allied force deals; coercion may have a similar effect to consent, but it achieves poor results and will not endure.

Transparency: Successful CIMIC requires the mutual trust and confidence of all those involved in an operation. CIMIC tasks and activities should be transparent, demonstrating competence, capability and resolve in order to win the trust and confidence of all elements of the civil environment. CIMIC personnel will be a valuable source of local information and will be advocates of the military cause, but they will rapidly become ineffective if used for collecting information for intelligence production or as a means of propagating disinformation.

Communication: effective communication with civil authorities, agencies, organisations and populations is vital for maintaining consent and co-operation. Differences between military and civilian organisations - whether perceived or otherwise - require an investment in time and understanding to overcome. Civilian organisations with which the military will deal are likely to pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the view that co-operation with the military and independence are mutually exclusive. The key to minimising these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication.

Italy, as a member of NATO, follows NATO's classification as regards mission definition as well as adopting its definition of the CIMIC concept and principles. Therefore, the behavioural profile that derives from these principles should also characterise the Italian military.

The Italian Carabinieri and the MSU[50]

The peculiarity of the Italian Carabinieri comes from their dual nature of military organisation with civil policing functions. Consequently, depending on the mission mandate they can be employed as a tool of the military chain of command in a combat environment as well as in peace enforcement operations, in peacekeeping operations or in a non-military context. As experience in PSOs developed throughout the 1990s, two fundamental issues for the creation of the MSU became apparent.

First, the acknowledgement that military contingents in PSOs often assume public security tasks, before a civil police mission is deployed, in order to substitute or strengthen the collapsed local structure.

Second, the need to fill what was defined as a "security gap" in the area of operations. These issues required the presence not only of civilian police to maintain law and order but also of a stronger force that would be able to use military force when and if needed. The Italian Carabinieri proved to be particularly suited to fill the security gap in peace support operations. In fact, their experience in the national territory provides them with skills for interaction with the civilian population and other civilians present in the area of operations, which are often missing in purely military contingents.

The Multinational Specialised Units (MSU) were institutionalised in February 1998 following a meeting of the foreign Ministers of NATO member countries, with the aim of establishing a police force with military status that would be specifically trained to operate in highly unstable areas and to handle crowd control. The Unit is able to act in order to manage the crisis intensity, and works preferably in conditions of instability, risk and complex operations. Because of this, it is particularly useful in PSOs, where it can operate: 1) in focused operations because of its quick capacity of reaction; 2) for intelligence activities; 3) in a military structure thanks to its police and military competencies, especially in multinational operations.

The unit was part of the SFOR mission, and adopted in the area of operations the same operational procedures as it applied at the domestic level. Different from the military police, it combined the need for military deterrence and investigative prevention, showing its potentialities as regards mobility, flexibility and adaptability. It was able to guarantee security and order conditions in the area where the friendly military forces operated, while also performing its duties in favour of the civilian population. NATO has recognised the important role of the MSU in PSOs throughout its various doctrinal publications, leading to the MSU definition, mission and tasks.

According to the NATO doctrine for Peace Support Operations, the MSU mission is to create a secure environment, and it is part of the mission of the military force: "over the long term local police should have primary responsibility for all civilian law enforcement issues. In the interim, and where this is not possible, the PSF [Peace Support Force] has the responsibility for creating a secure environment. MSUs provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with police forces that have a military status and the training, experience and capability to deal with this area of public security".[51]

Coherently with this definition and role, NATO doctrine assigns the MSU a wide range of tasks that in a stable environment are performed by civil police forces, and that should be handed to the civilian or local police as soon as the situation allows it: "MSU roles may include information gathering, investigations, criminal intelligence, counter terrorism, maintenance of law and order, and public security matters. The aim should be for MSU and other PSF components to transfer

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[50] Sources used for this Annex are the proceedings from the *MSU Seminar* held in Rome in March 2003, available at www.carabinieri.it.
[51] NATO *AJP 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations*, 2001, par. 0529.

civilian law enforcement responsibilities to civilian police components of the PSO, and/or to local civilian police forces, at the earliest feasible point in the course of the operation."[52]

Since 2001, the MSU capabilities have become operational, particularly in Peace Support Operations and Multilateral interventions, with the purpose of creating, maintaining and promoting the rule of law during the transition phase after a conflict. In the Balkans, the role of the MSU was particularly significant as regards public security and order.

In the case of joint coalition units, such as KFOR in Kosovo, the MSU play a central role because of their "intermediate"[53] nature as civilian police and military force.

The MSU operate within the broader framework defined by PSOs and especially within the civil-military context. Indeed, the Carabinieri, as MSU, often act as the interface between the military and civilian components of current PSOs, be it through NATO CIMIC or other civil-military relations mechanisms.

The MSU possess human resources and investigative tools to analyse subversive or criminal organisations' structure, and provide prevention and repression sources to use as KFOR assets. In the UNMIK mission (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) they also work in collaboration with the UN Police in the field of criminal investigation and intelligence. Since 2001, the Carabinieri have taken part in NATO missions in Macedonia as military police and as MSU units.

In recent times, MSU forces have been involved in a wide range of activities: law enforcement, fight against terrorism, logistic support, intelligence, and local police training. Indeed, one of their main characteristics is that of being a flexible tool, with features such as adequate competence for their duties, mobility, durability and versatility.

Other important features are the use of minimum force and firepower possible, and preference for long-term commitment and employment of individuals or small units. In addition, information gathering through patrols and the use of negotiation are their main proactive measures. All these characteristics have been recognized to be effective in high complex conditions.

From an analysis of these functions derives the need to create and maintain a close relation with the civilian environment, and even more so with the local population, as its acceptance and trust constitute key elements for the success of the mission. This need constitutes the natural link between the MSU and civil-military relations. Indeed, by definition, their duties naturally lead the MSU towards the civilian environment, which makes them particularly suitable for civil-military cooperation tasks.

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[52] *Ibidem*

[53] Italian official documents and academia define the Carabinieri 'polizia intermedia' – 'intermediate police', stressing their dual civil and military features.

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